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ABSTRACT: The 21st century is witness to an unprecedented and rapid growth of human settlements, from urban centers to
wilderness vacation resorts. Concurrent with this has been the growing tolerance and acceptance of many wild animals and humans
for one another. This has created an expanding ‘zone’ of human-animal contacts, some number of which invariably result in
conflicts. While the vast majority of our interactions with wild animals are undoubtedly benign, it is the conflict between wildlife
and people that draws particularly close attention from the public. Animals viewed as vertebrate “pests” range from the small to the
large, the timid to the fierce, and the benign to the dangerous. With respect to all is the issue that bridges both environmental and
social concerns– what is the ‘right’ thing to do about resolving conflicts? Wildlife agencies in North America continue to stress
traditional approaches to managing wildlife problems by focusing on regulated hunting, trapping, and poisoning. Yet contemporary
human-wildlife conflicts have scientific, political, and moral dimensions that are not well addressed by those traditions.
Controversy and polarization arise from differing ethics of how we ought to live with non-human animals. Wildlife protection
interests argue that many common and current wildlife control practices, such as the drowning of “nuisance” animals, are ethically
ungrounded. A practical ethic guiding our response to human-animal conflicts is, they argue, therefore needed. This ethics should
inform “pest” control policy and management, as well as articulate a vision of our place in a mixed community of people and
animals. This paper explores this need.
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INTRODUCTION
Although damage caused by wildlife to human
interests has engaged our attention from time
immemorial, it is only recently that a formal discipline of
wildlife damage management has emerged (Conover
2002). In the United States, attention turned to both the
scientific and practical aspects of wildlife control not long
after the Civil War. This came first in the form of
academic pursuits aimed at determining the feeding
habits of different wildlife species and how they helped or
harmed agricultural interests. Soon an emerging federal
bureaucracy, the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey, took
to the field with large-scale predator and rodent control
programs that were anything but academic (Robinson
2005). For a long time, both federal and private sector
efforts focused on the simple expedient of killing as many
predators and other animals thought injurious to crops
and livestock as possible. Wide-scale trapping and
poisoning programs took both target and non-target
species in numbers sufficient to allow the assumption that
the “control” was making a difference to the interests of
producers. The indiscriminate killing, however, resulted
in challenge and criticism from both professional as well
as lay sources (Shaw and Schmidly 1994, Olsen 1971).
With the environmental revolution of the 1960s and 70s
and the rise of awareness on animal welfare and
protection issues (e.g. Singer 1975, Midgley 1984), the
ethical underpinnings of these programs, and by
association all wildlife damage practices, were brought
sharply into public debate. Schmidt (1989a,b) and

Schmidt and Salmon (1991) raised the question of animal
welfare, damage control, and ethics and called for a
dialogue on the issues. That dialogue has been engaged
in Europe and Australasia (Harris 1985, Feare 1994,
Kirkwood et al. 1994, Fisher and Marks 1996, Eggleston
et al. 2003); in North America it essentially has not.
This paper seeks to achieve two aims. The first is to
challenge the quietude that exists around the idea of
discussing ethics in wildlife management, particularly in
North America. The second is to help set a broader
dialogue on the ethics that ought to guide the research,
policy, and implementation of wildlife control. The
context for this discussion is the urbanizing and globalizing world, where human domination of environments
threatens everything from individual animals to the
ecosystems that sustain entire communities of living
things. Our objective is not to claim any moral high
ground or to aver that one or another of the many forms
of ethics should be practiced and followed in pursuit of
any truth. It is simply to open discussion and play the
next hand in the game, intending if nothing else to
rekindle a flame that seems almost extinguished.
HUMANIZED LANDSCAPES
Although there is a strong argument to be made that
none of the earth’s ecosystems remain unaffected by
humans some, such as the agricultural and urban, are
clearly dominated by our actions (Vitousek et al. 1997).
Societies have turned virtually all the world’s arable land
(and more) over to human use and now absorb a hugely
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disproportionate share of the world’s biological
productivity (Goudie 1994). In addition, our world is
increasingly urbanizing (and globalizing), so much so that
agricultural pursuits serve principally the demands made
by cities and can be best viewed as part of their ecological
“footprint” (Rees and Wackernagel 1996). Hence, we
speak of ‘humanized’ landscapes.
The term “urban wildlife” has been called an
oxymoron (Platt 1994), but there is no longer much doubt
that wild animals have adapted to and become a
significant presence in urban environments (Hadidian and
Smith 2001). In terms of preserving elements of
biodiversity, this should be a good thing, except where
human values and wildlife activities clash. Then, damage
control is expected and often practiced by means that are
“traditional,” frequently lethal, and often at the center of
debates about the right and wrong treatment of animals.
Within ‘humanized’ environments, wildlife comes to
have policy, science, and management implications that
present novel challenges. Beaver build dams in the
floodplains from which they were long ago trapped out
and are then blamed for causing floods. Deer eat the
farmer’s crops, as they have always, but are now so
abundant that the damage they cause cannot be controlled
by simply killing the offenders. They also settle into the
fragmented landscapes of suburbia that creates the edge
habitat so favorable to their kind, and from there range
into back yards to damage ornamental plantings, raising
new and unexpected concerns that are debated in terms of
knotty ethical issues (Lynn 2005). Questions concerning
ethics are raised whether invited (and recognized) or not.
ETHICS
Still, the controversies surrounding wildlife in
humanized landscapes are complex enough that it might
be reasonable to ask: why make it worse by throwing
ethics into the mix? It may be helpful, then, to start out
with a simple definition of what it means to think and act
ethically.
By ethics we are simply exploring ‘how we ought to
live’ (Socrates in Plato’s Republic, Book 1:352d). In its
most straightforward sense, ethics is a conversation about
the moral values that inform (or should inform) our
thoughts and actions. It is important to note from the
outset that ethics should not be confused with religion,
spirituality, custom, or personal commitments. Enriched
as it may be by these sources, it is not reducible to them.
Rather, ethics is a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary
dialogue that uses reason and evidence to promote the
health and well-being not only of people, but of animals
and the rest of nature. As importantly, ethics is not only a
critique of who we are as individuals and a society today,
it is a vision of what our future may be if we act with
ethical sensibilities in mind. Finally, ethics is not about
rules or absolute truths. Both the human and natural
worlds are too complex for such simplistic thinking.
Instead, ethics is meant to help us refine our knowledge
and action, to distinguish better from worse arguments,
methods, data and facts (Lynn 2006). Overall, it is best to
avoid arguments about what moral theory is ‘right’, and
instead look to what various moral theories are right
about (Weston 2006).

When it comes to ethics and wildlife, there are several
issues we ignore at our peril. The first is the issue of
values gridlock. The stickiest problems in human-animal
relations have little or nothing to do with scientific data
and models, much less management techniques. Instead,
they are deeply rooted ethical conflicts over coexisting
with non-human others. Thus how and why we choose to
manage ourselves and other animals is the real essence of
wildlife control. To resolve this issue, we must face our
conflicting values directly. When we fail to do so,
resolutions are delayed, differing interests become
entrenched, and we reach a point of political, policy and
management impasse. This is values gridlock.
The second issue is transparency. Transparency
should name a real concern for openness and access to the
relevant information and decision-making processes
necessary to the efficient and ethical operations of
government, corporations, and civil society. At one level,
this is simply about professionals being honest about their
practices, disclosing conflicts of interest, and respecting
the voice of non-professionals in democratic deliberations. At another level, it means examining the assumptions and points of view that are taken for granted by
most professions, such as their approach to urban wildlife
policy and management. Transparency is facilitated
when individuals and groups are not simply critical of
others, but are self-reflective about their own ideas and
practices. Thus, transparency in wildlife management
and control should not be a post hoc exercise in applying
ethics to wildlife issues. Rather, the ideas we have about
how we value and relate to wildlife are themselves
informed by our individual and collective moral norms.
In this sense, ethical issues are not only down-stream,
out-of-the-pipe issues. They are also up-stream, into-thedrain issues.
Finally, there is the issue of intrinsic value. The idea
here is that all animals have an intrinsic value in themselves, irrespective of their use to other animals (human
or otherwise). The opposite term is extrinsic value
(sometimes instrumental value), where someone or thing
is held to be of value only for their instrumental purposes,
that is, what he, she or it can be used for. For example, a
person sitting at a bar has intrinsic value (inherent worth),
while the ale in front of her has extrinsic value
(instrumental worth). The purpose of the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic value is to call our ethical
attention to the fact that human and non-human animals
should have moral standing and significance. We cannot
make decisions about wildlife control without acknowledging the moral value of so-called “pests.” Indeed, even
the word “pest” bespeaks a moral flippancy towards
wildlife that should be questioned.
With the above ethical issues in mind, consider the
following case studies. Each was chosen to exemplify the
moral issues described above– gridlock, transparency,
and intrinsic value– but each represents as well not only
these but other issues of conflicting moral values that
come into play in our relationships with non-human
animals.
THE COYOTE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
In 1996, in the bucolic northern California county of
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Marin, value gridlock over the use of the poison
Compound 1080 to kill coyotes led to a rancorous debate
about management of native carnivores in a community
known for its environmental consciousness and strong
support of agriculture (Fox 2001). On one side were
animal advocates and conservation groups who
questioned the ethics of using taxpayer dollars to employ
a federal (USDA Wildlife Services) trapper to kill native
wildlife with predator poisons, denning, and bodygripping traps. On the other side were sheep ranchers
who argued that federal assistance with predator
management was necessary and that loss of such
assistance would put them over the edge in a market that
was already being undermined with cheap imports from
overseas.
After a series of roundtable discussions organized by
the Marin County Agricultural Commissioner that
included ranchers, animal advocates, conservationists,
and local public officials, the Marin County Board of
Supervisors attempted to reach a compromise with the
WS. The Supervisors said they would renew the contract
with the federal agency but stipulated that neck snares
and other lethal methods could only be used a last resort
after non-lethal methods had been tried and proven
unsuccessful (Fox 2001). When WS stated they were
unwilling to set such a precedent, the Marin County
Board of Supervisors decided it was in the county’s best
interest to cease contracting with the agency. The
decision, however, did not prevent ranchers from killing
predators on their own land to protect their livestock.
In place of the traditional WS program, the
Supervisors approved of a program put forth by a
coalition of animal and conservation organizations and
later more fully developed by the Marin County
Agricultural Commissioner’s office with input from the
ranching community. The plan, called the “Strategic Plan
for Protection of Livestock and Wildlife,” redirected the
county’s $30,000 annual cost for WS to assist qualified
ranchers in implementing non-lethal techniques including
livestock guard dogs, llamas, improved fencing, and
lambing sheds, and shepherding. At the request of local
ranchers, a county cost-share indemnification program
was added to the plan to compensate qualified ranchers
for verified livestock losses resulting from predation.
To date, more than 80% of all Marin sheep ranchers
participate in the program and initial data indicates
livestock losses have declined since implementation of
the program (Brenner 2005, Carlsen 2005, Agocs 2007).
Importantly, the program provides a model that has
successfully addressed and embraced ethical concerns as
well as differing values expressed by both the animal
protection and ranching communities (Fox 2001, Fox and
Papouchis 2005).
THE GOOSE IN THE PARK
Twenty years ago the sight of a Canada goose (Branta
canadensis spp.) in a municipal park in much of North
America would have been a notable curiosity. Today,
these geese are so common in many urban areas as to be
labeled “sky carp” (Ankney 1996). The most recent
proposal for management of the continental Canada
goose population from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

calls for the population of these birds that resides in the
lower 48 states after March– the so-called “resident”
geese– to be reduced by somewhere between 400,000 and
800,000 birds per year for the next 10 years. This will, it
is calculated, drop the number from a little more than 3
million to around 2 million. To animal protection
interests, what is lacking in these plans, as well as in the
actions already undertaken by some state and federal
agencies, is transparency.
The Canada goose “problem” is in large part almost
certainly due to the widespread propagation and
dissemination of geese begun in the late 1960s and 1970s
by wildlife managers after the “rediscovery” of the nearly
extinct subspecies or race that represents the “giant” (B. c.
maxima) form (Cooper 1987). In this respect, the
controversy and sometimes polemic over geese comes
about largely as a self-inflicted wound. It does not help
that the majority of identified problems with geese seem
solely to have to do with aesthetics. Nor, that the most
expedient and economical way to deal with the birds has
been to hold goose “roundups” during the annual molt,
when flightless geese are easily captured and either
shipped to commercial poultry houses for slaughter or
killed in the field and disposed of at landfills. From an
icon of seasonal change, as they moved along migratory
pathways, to a villainous despoiler of the manicured
lawns of golf course, parks, and playing fields, Canada
geese are targeted for such widespread destruction that it
almost seems as if they deliberately planned to take
humanity on in a challenge for supremacy on urban lands.
THE FOX IN THE YARD
Almost a week to the day after moving in to a fairly
upscale suburban neighborhood outside of a major
eastern city, a woman looks out her window late one
morning to see a small reddish dog-like animal trotting
across the lawn. The animal moves swiftly and with
apparent determination to get somewhere quickly, but it
stops when it comes to the edge of the wooded area that
forms a mutual boundary with other houses in the
subdivision. She looks back over her shoulder for a
moment and trots on into the woods. The woman realizes
after a moment that she has been watching a fox– an
animal she has never seen before. She does not stop to
think even briefly that this fox might ‘belong’ there, or
that is has in any sense intrinsic value.
The woman, instead, is concerned– she remembers
reading somewhere that foxes can get rabies and that
when they are active by day this can be a sign of illness.
She finds the number for the local nature center and calls
them. They tell her that the fox is probably not ill, but
that she should call her local animal control agency if she
remains concerned. She does, and is told that daytime
activity is one of the things they take special note of, but
that they will not send someone out to her house unless
the fox is in her yard and under close observation by her.
She calls the state wildlife agency and is told they do not
respond to urban wildlife calls, but that they can make
referrals to businesses and individuals who do provide
wildlife control services for a fee. She calls the first on
the list she is given and is told that the animal she saw
was probably not rabid, but that if she were truly
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concerned about the safety of her children or pets, she
could have the animal trapped.
She is quoted a price and, deciding to err on the side
of caution, agrees to have the fox trapped. A man arrives
later that day and looks around the yard, choosing sites on
which to set traps, which he does, cautioning her to keep
the cat and dog indoors for a couple of days until he has
been able to catch the offending animal. Two days later
she sees him cross the yard early in the morning carrying
a black plastic bag in which something with weight is
obviously held. He presents his bill a few minutes later
with the terse announcement that her fox “problem” has
been taken care of.
A STEP BACK
What then can we learn from the foregoing cases? Let
us focus on the matters they raise with a series of didactic
questions, aimed at raising awareness of the complex and
multi-layered moral questions involved in each. Are the
values of one set of stakeholders more important than
another when gridlock freezes movement on an issue?
Are economic interests important in setting value? Are
the values held by experienced professionals more
important than those held by a public at large?
What responsibility does a federal agency have to
share information with the public? Knowing that activists
might seek to disrupt round up and slaughter operations,
should the date and time of such planned activities be
released? Should information be released about where,
when, and how many geese have been killed immediately
after a roundup, a year after the fact, or two years, or
never?
Does a fox that walks through a yard have a ‘right’ to
do so, or does a human have a greater right to see it be
killed for simply committing this offense? Do wildlife
professionals have a responsibility to educate their clients
and provide information on both lethal and non-lethal
solutions? Do they have a responsibility to police their
own ranks, and censure their peers when their practice is
ethically unjustified? These are just a few of the many
questions we might start asking ourselves about the ethics
of wildlife control.
NEXT STEPS: THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL
ETHICS
If we want to think about wildlife control from an
ethical viewpoint, how then should we proceed? More to
the point, how can we proceed while avoiding the
dogmatism and an absolute set of moral rules? The
answer is surprisingly easy. It is practical ethics.
Practical ethics is not a particular theory or method per
se. It is instead part of a very old family of ethics, and
developed in the religious, legal, and medical arenas.
Practical ethics focuses on the full range of moral values
that inform our lives, such as what is right, good, just, and
caring. Practical ethics looks to these and other moral
concepts, as well as the empirical reality of individual
cases, for guidance in making ethical decisions. By
honoring the insights of many moral ideas, practical
ethics has a deep reservoir of concepts available to
triangulate on the best understanding of a moral problem.
Because it is rooted in concrete cases, the choice of

concepts can better fit a site or a situation, while
simultaneously providing guidance for our thought and
action. Altogether, this is why practical ethics is not
simply a theory or method, but a situated moral
understanding (Lynn 2006).
We suggest that the development of a practical ethics
will help guide the wildlife profession and inform wildlife
policy and management. While the details of this are
obviously too large a topic for this paper alone, we can
make a start by proposing the use of principles, maxims,
and rules in ethical decision making about wildlife
control. As we do so, we cannot expect practical ethics to
provide a simple, absolute, or fool-proof set of answers to
human-animal conflicts in the field. What we can expect,
however, is for practical ethics to help us distinguish
better from worse ways of thinking and acting, and in so
doing, help the profession reflect upon and improve its
politics, policies, and practices.
A principle is a moral concept used to clarify our
thinking. Principles name the broadest category of ethical
thinking in wildlife control, and provide guidance about
how we ought to live. Questions about the intrinsic value
of animals, or our vision of how humans and wildlife
should coexist, are examples of thinking at the principle
level. A maxim is a moral concept used to clarify our
actions. Maxims provide more focused guidance about
what actions we should take in every day life. Whether
we should use lethal or non-lethal control measures on
this or that family of foxes is an example of where a
maxim would come in handy. A rule is a still more
focused moral concept. It requires or prohibits certain
actions, and is justified by one or more principles and
maxims. Banning the use of Conibear traps because they
indiscriminately kill non-target domestic and wild
animals is an example of such a rule.
Finally, to be effective, a practical ethics for wildlife
control will need to function as a template for inclusion
into state and federal wildlife management planning. To
undertake this analysis, federal, state, and local agencies
may need to incorporate a position and/or department that
specifically addresses ethical issues surrounding wildlife
management. Academia will also need to adapt, with the
ethics of wildlife management included as a core
requirement in natural resource and environmental studies
curricula.
CONCLUSIONS
There is a growing recognition of the need for a
dialogue on ethics in wildlife management (Eggleston et
al. 2003). As is the case for biodiversity managers
(Minter and Collins 2005), however, no subfield
specializing in this pursuit as yet exists. It should. Ethics
should be incorporated into all curricula, major meetings
and conferences on wildlife, and state and federal wildlife
agencies should establish ethics components in agency
operations and procedures. To ignore ethics and shifting
public values toward wildlife risks not only alienating a
large segment of the populace, but also more importantly
of eroding the credibility and efficacy of wildlife
management agencies. The recent use of the public ballot
initiative process that restrict certain wildlife management
practices, such as trapping and the use of poisons, is but
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one example of the potential backlash when the public
and certain segments of society feel their concerns and
ethical values are not being heard or considered. We
offer this paper as a renewed step in this dialogue and
look forward to the ensuing discussions regarding the role
and place of practical ethics within the fields of wildlife
management and control.
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